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BASIC INCOME ATTITUDES AND WELFARE REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY BASED ON THE SURVEY RESULTS FROM SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Abstract: The main goal of this article is to compare the opinions of citizens from four European countries (Germany, Great Britain, Spain and Poland) regarding basic income in the broader context, among other things, of welfare regimes these countries represent. Statistical analyses of the Europeans' attitudes towards basic income are based on interviews carried out in 28 European Union countries. Four countries, representing four different types of welfare regimes that can be found in the literature (the Nordic model has been excluded due to the sample size), and differing in economic welfare as well as historical experiences in regard to socio-economic system formation, have been selected for further analysis. Our analysis is based on special use of the single posthoc test with the Bonferroni adjustment for evaluating cross-country differences in basic income support and use of logistic regression for verifying the within-country impact of particular effects on basic income attitudes. The results of our analysis do not confirm that either the type of welfare regime or the level of social services in particular countries have a significant impact on attitudes toward basic income attitudes. However, we found the clear and direct impact of basic income awareness on supporting the programme.

Keywords: basic income; welfare regimes; basic income attitudes; Dalia Research

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Postawy wobec dochodu i reżimy dobrobytu: studium przypadku oparte na wynikach analiz porównawczych w wybranych krajach europejskich

Streszczenie

Głównym cel artykułu dotyczy porównania opinii obywatelek i obywateli czterech krajów europejskich (Polski, Wielkiej Brytanii, Hiszpanii i Niemiec) na temat bezwarunkowego dochodu podstawowego w szerszym kontekście modeli państw dobrobytu, które te państwa reprezentują (lub do których są zaliczane). Podstawą analiz statystycznych stosunku Europejczyków do idei dochodu podstawowego będą badania sondażowe zrealizowane przez niemiecką firmę badawczą Dalia Research w 28 krajach starego kontynentu. Do szczegółowych eksploracji wybrane zostały cztery wyżej wymienione państwa, ponieważ

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reprezentują one odmienne typy reżimów dobrobytu występujące w literaturze przedmiotu (model nordycki został pominięty ze względu na niską liczebność próby badawczej), oraz różnią się pod względem warunków gospodarczych i doświadczeń historycznych w zakresie tworzenia formacji społeczno-gospodarczej. Nasze ustalenia opierają się na analizie statystycznej ze szczególnym zastosowaniem *single post-hoc test* z korektą Bonferroniego do oceny międzykrajowych różnic w poparciu dochodu podstawowego oraz zastosowaniu regresji logistycznej do weryfikacji wewnątrzkrajowego wpływu poszczególnych skutków na postawy względem dochodu podstawowego.

Słowa kluczowe: dochód podstawowy; reżimy dobrobytu; postawy wobec dochodu podstawowego; Dalia Research

Introduction

The discussion about the basic income proposal has gone beyond the purely theoretical sphere where the future of alternative methods of partial income redistribution is being considered as method to assure social welfare. Numerous experiments conducted in both lower developed countries (Kenya, India, Namibia, Uganda), as well as ones forming the core of capitalist economies (Finland, Canada, Italy), suggest that universal basic income (UBI) has become a serious proposal for the reorganization of currently existing welfare state institutions. Bearing in mind that the results of some experiments carried out (for example in India or Namibia) cannot be directly translated onto European countries, and the selective criteria of others (for Finland (see Bershidsky 2018)), it is worthwhile to concentrate on the analyses of citizen attitudes towards the issue. The recognition of social attitudes towards basic income, and the factors affecting them, constitute a litmus test of future changes in public policies. In this paper, attention is paid to the differences in attitudes towards basic income that exist between countries representing different welfare regimes, as well as the generosity of social policies. Based on chosen models of welfare state organisation, several hypotheses were formulated, which were then tested on the results of opinion polls carried out in European Union member states by a German company Dalia Research. The main problem undertaken in this paper is whether there are differences in attitudes towards basic income that are linked to (a) welfare regime, (b) level (generosity) of social benefits and security, and (c) awareness of the UBI proposal. Looking at the declared consequences of UBI introduction stated by the respondents, theoretical arguments present in the voluminous literature on the subject, both for and against the proposal, have been considered.

Literature review – welfare regimes

Since the end of World War II, and therefore within a specific and defined social climate, we have been observing a proliferation – particularly in capitalist

European economies – of welfare state institutions. These institutions were meant to serve a number of particular socio-economic and political goals, which had for their foundation the aim to mitigate major social risks, linked to factors such as illness, age, unemployment, or poverty. Protection against these social risks was supposed to result in social integration and implementation of the idea of social fairness, but foremost, to ensure comprehensive welfare to the widest range of social categories possible. To realise these goals, each country introduced different methods of ensuring social welfare, depending on individual factors affecting it, the main ones being differences in political factions in power, cultural determinants and economic potential.

Although there are many welfare state typologies, each based on different criteria, there are several which had a marked influence on the discussion about welfare regimes. One of the pioneering works in the field was "Industrial Society and Social Welfare" (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958), which, although concentrated solely on American experiences, looked at the issue of social stratification in the context of welfare services development (Hunter 1958). Richard M. Titmuss' book "Social Policy: An Introduction" (1974) describes three models of social policy: the Residual-Welfare, the Industrial Achievement-Performance, and the Institutional-Redistributive. Ramesh Mishra proposed a division into two types: residual and institutional (Mishra 1981). However, the most widely discussed typology was proposed by a Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen in his book "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (1990), in which he defined three regimes: liberal, conservative (corporatist) and social democratic. This proposal resulted in a great discussion between welfare state institutions scholars, both critical and affirmative (Arts and Gelissen 2002). It was later reproduced, i.e. tested again to see "whether there are still three clusters of welfare-state regimes in the capitalist countries" (Talme 2014), using new data. In the presented article, a broadened Esping-Andersen three-regime typology, proposed by Heien and Hofäcker (1999), will be used. Latin Rim and socialist were added to liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes types. Latin Rim would be typical for southern Europe, although there is no consensus on whether countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal truly form a separate welfare regime (Ferrera 1996). As for post-socialist countries, they couldn't have formed a separate category in the 1990 work of the Danish sociologist for two reasons. First and foremost, Esping-Andersen's analysis looked at capitalist countries, and, secondly, being based on data from the 1980s, it couldn't have accounted for the distinctiveness of countries which would only undergo a systemic transformation a decade later. However, now, almost thirty years from the changes in Central-Eastern Europe, the former socialist regimes should seriously be considered as a separate type of welfare state.

Figure 1. Expenditure on social protection, 2004-2014 (% of GDP)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
DE	29,0	28,9	27,8	26,8	27,1	30,5	29,8	28,6	28,7	29,0	29,1
ES	19,9	20,1	20,0	20,3	21,4	24,4	24,6	25,3	25,5	25,8	25,4
PL	20,3	20,0	19,7	18,4	19,3	20,3	19,7	18,7	18,9	19,4	19,1
GB	24,6	25,3	25,3	24,8	25,9	28,8	29,1	29,1	29,2	28,4	27,4

Source: Eurostat (online data code: spr_exp_sum)

In the context of the subject matter of the article, an important issue is the relationship between the welfare state model and welfare attitudes (Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot 2013), as well as the relation between the welfare state type and social spending (Figure 1). The figure 1, covering data from 2004 to 2014, shows a significant variation in social spending (measured as a percentage of GDP). Of the four countries analysed, Poland has the lowest percentage of these expenditures, while Germany and the United Kingdom have the highest one. In the period of 2004–2006 social spending in Spain – which in some systematics is included in the Continental model – was similar to that in Poland, in the following years it increased significantly. The level of expenditures related to welfare institutions in Poland remained practically at the same level.

However, literature on welfare attitudes remains extremely diverse (Fletcher and Flint 2018, Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen 2014, Svallfors 2003, Svallfors 2004), e.g. on "attitudes about what the welfare state should do and beliefs about its actual performance" (Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen 2014:200), it is necessary to take into account the differences between the opinions of respondents and the criteria for distinguishing welfare state models. Surveys of attitudes towards basic income in this study are aimed at analysing the differences and similarities in the evaluation of this programme from the

perspective of the functioning institutional arrangements of the welfare state. However, it should be borne in mind that the respondents' attitudes depend on many uncontrolled or difficult to control factors, including those of an individual nature (e.g. labour market status, future expectations, emotional situation, etc.) (see Chaiklin 2011, Voas 2014).

Differences in basic income definitions

Basic income, according to Jurgen De Wispelaere and Leticia Morales (2016: 2), is "typically defined as an individual's entitlement to receive a regular payment *as a right*, independent of other sources of income, employment or willingness to work, or living situation." In order to make this general definition more precise, we use the guidelines from *Basic Income Earth Network* (2017), which list five characteristics of basic income. It is:

1) periodic: it is paid at regular intervals (for example every month), not as a one-off grant;
2) cash payment: it is paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who receive it to decide what they spend it on. It is not, therefore, paid either in kind (such as food or services) or in vouchers dedicated to a specific use;
3) individual: it is paid on an individual basis – and not, for instance, to households;
4) universal: it is paid to all, without means test;
5) unconditional: it is paid without a requirement to work or to demonstrate willingness-to-work.

Considering the defining characteristics of basic income, and also the fact that this proposal is understood differently by individual researchers studying it, let us have a look at the definition used in the study conducted by Dalia Research: „A basic income is an income unconditionally paid by the government to every individual regardless of whether they work and irrespective of any other source of income. It replaces other social security payments and is high enough to cover all basic needs (food, housing etc.)." (from questionnaire)

When interpreting the study's results, it is important to bear this definition of basic income in mind, particularly the part claiming that other social security payments would be replaced, which can imply elimination of all existing services. In reality – although, as was pointed out already, UBI's proponents do not present a homogenous stance – some of the services functioning currently would not be reduced (particularly regarding social categories requiring social assistance more than others, like persons with disabilities).

Hypotheses

The main hypothesis of this paper regards the relationship between the welfare regime and support/lack thereof for universal basic income program. Because UBI is thought of as either (a) supplement to existing welfare state institutions, or (b) a radical, but still a reform of these welfare institutions. That is why we expect a difference in support for UBI between countries representing different welfare regimes (hypothesis 1), and we expect there to be a difference between the countries that depends on certain variables (e.g. the effect UBI will have on employment, retraining, further training, volunteering). We also assume that the level of social benefits offered, and their availability, will have an influence on the support or lack thereof for UBI (hypothesis 2), regardless of the formal welfare regime.

We therefore assume in hypothesis 1 (H1), that in the residual (liberal regime in Esping-Andersen's typology) model of welfare state, the support for basic income will be lower than in other regimes (particularly in the social-democrat model, which has not been analysed in this paper, and in continental). In the second hypothesis (H2), it is assumed – in opposition to suggestions derived from the welfare regime criterion – that Poland will have the highest support for the basic income program (because of the relatively low level of social services and security). And thus, in Spain it should be higher than in Germany and Great Britain. The third hypothesis (H3) is linked to basic income awareness, and the questionnaire used by Dalia Research includes a question „How familiar are you with the concept known as »basic income«?" We assume that persons who have knowledge about basic income will be more likely to support this program than those who do not (a mechanism similar to neophobia). Therefore, the third hypothesis is independent from the welfare state model and the quality of welfare services, but focuses on basic income awareness. Besides the three hypotheses, we analysed declarations regarding both negative and positive assumed consequences of UBI introduction on other aspects of socioeconomic and cultural life. Based on existing literature on welfare regimes, a number of specific hypotheses about the consequences of UBI introduction could be formulated (eg tendency to quit current job or working less hours after UBI is introduced would be smaller in Great Britain than Poland or Spain). We decided against such specific analysis of the assumed interdependencies, as each discussed aspect would require an expanded commentary. Instead, we chose to look at all the independent variables used in Dalia Research's study together, in order to focus on statistically important results.

Data & Methods

To verify the three research hypotheses, we used data from the Basic Income Survey, which is the first large scale survey of the Europeans' opinions and attitudes towards basic income. This study was conducted by Dalia Research in 2016. The total sample of 9.649 respondents (14–65 years old) was drawn across all 28 EU Member States, considering current population distributions with regards to age, gender and region/country. However, since in some countries the sample size was extremely small, it was impossible to carry out a between-country comparison of public opinion across all 28 EU Member States. Thus, we decided to select only four countries, i.e., Germany, Spain, Great Britain and Poland, each representing a different type of welfare regime (respectively: continental (conservative-corporatist), Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon (liberal or residual), and post-communist), in which the sample sizes range from 860 to 1420 individuals.

Table 1. presents the basic characteristics of survey sample, i.e., sample size, weighting (design) effect, effective sample size and the margin of error at the 95% confidence interval in four countries included in our analysis.

Table 1. Basic characteristics of survey sample in four countries

Country[i]	Sample size	Weighting effect	Effective sample size	Margin of error (95% CI)
DE	1420	1.24	1142	+/- 2.9 pp.
ES	1005	1.51	667	+/- 3.8 pp.
GB	1199	1.22	979	+/- 3.1 pp.
PL	860	1.50	578	+/- 4.1 pp.

Note: [i] Countries are labelled according to ISO31166-1

In order to obtain census representative results the survey data were weighted based upon Eurostat population distributions of gender, age, level of education (defined by ESCED-2011 levels: 0-2; 3-4; 5-8) and degree of urbanization (rural/urban area). An iterative algorithm was used by Dalia Research statisticians to identify the optimal combination of weighting variables based on sample demographic composition within each country. An estimation of overall design effect due to post stratification weighting was calculated at 1.45 at the global level. In our analysis, we used the Dalia Research weights, however, since we do not consider the global measures of basic income attitudes, the original weights were normed accordingly to the sample size in each country.

The main concept that we implemented in our analysis refers to the respondents' support for UBI idea. Since the purpose of our study was to analyse the cross-country differences in the citizens support for UBI or opposition against

it, we defined two separate indicators describing *strong support for UBI* and *strong opposition against UBI*. Both indicators are based on the single choice question: *If there would be a referendum on introducing basic income today, how would you vote?*, with the following answer options: [1] "I would vote for it", [2] "I would probably vote for it", [3] "I would probably vote against it", [4] "I would vote against it" and [5] "I would not vote". The indicator of strong support for UBI was defined as the percentage of all respondents who chose the answer "I would vote for it" among those who declared their would vote. Respectively, the indicator of strong opposition against UBI was defined as a percentage of respondents who declared participation in a possible referendum and chose the option "I would vote against it".

On the basis of a Dalia Research questionnaire, we also defined two indicators of *basic income awareness* and three indicators of *basic income effect*. Both indicators of *basic income awareness* are based on a same single choice question: *How familiar are you with the concept known as 'basic income'*, with four response options: [1] "I understand it fully", [2] "I know something about it", [3] "I have heard just a little about it", and [4] "I have never heard of it". The first indicator describes the percentage of respondents declaring that they "understand UBI fully", while the second describes the percentage of those who "have never heard of it".

In constructing *basic income effect* indicators, a multiple choice question was used: *What could be the most likely effect of basic income in your work choices?*, with the following answers: [1] "I would stop working", [2] "I would work less", [3] "I would do more volunteering work", [4] "I would spend more time with my family", [5] "I would look for a different job", [6] I would work as a freelancer, [7] "I would gain additional skills" or [8] "A basic income would not affect my work choices". The first indicator of basic income effect, i.e., *no possible effect indicator*, provides information about percentage of respondents declaring that the UBI would not affect their work choices. The second indicators, i.e., *negative effect indicator*, provides information of respondents predicting that as a result of UBI being introduced they would stop working at all, or work less. Finally, the last indicator of basic income effect, i.e., *positive effect indicator*, compiles the respondents' who would spend more time with their families or would spend time gaining additional skills if the UBI would be implemented[1].

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[1] The order of questions in the Dalia Research questionnaire, as pointed out by one of the reviewers, is not without impact on the answers given by the respondents – especially in terms of suport for the UBI and the effects of the implementation of this programme. The construction of the questionnaire was as follows: the demographical questions were preceded by the question „How familiar are you with the concept known as 'basic income'?". This question and the definition of basic income were followed by a question about suport/ lack of support for the UBI, and then the respondents were asked about the consequences of the introduction of basic

Findings

Out of the four studied countries, the largest support for UBI was declared in Spain. Together, the strong („I would vote for it") and the weaker („I would probably vote for it") choices gathered over 71% support in this Mediterranean country. Similar results were also obtained in the other countries (PL 62.3%, GB 63.1%, DE 63.2%).

Figure 2. Basic income vote[(i),(ii)]

Notes: [(i)] Single choice question: *If there would be a referendum on introducing basic income today, how would you vote*?: [1] – I would vote for it; [2] – I would probably vote for it; [3] – I would probably vote against it; [4] – I would vote against it; [5] – I would not vote.
[(ii)] Pearson's chi-square statistic for testing whether *basic income vote* is *country* invariant: Chi-square=90.83; df=12; p-value<0.001.

The first hypothesis, in which we assumed that in the residual model the support for UBI will be the lowest, is only reflected in the strong answer option, as the lowest precentage of respondents that would definitely support the proposal in a referendum was found in Britain (25%). Interestingly, the highest number of respondents who would not support UBI were found in Germany, which represents the continental model of social policy; this, regarding the absence of a social-democratic regime representative, goes against the initial assumption. The most coherent representation of UBI support, i.e. the highest support and the lowest ratio of negative answers, was reported in Spain. Polish respondents supported the UBI proposal similarly often to those in Germany or GB, but expressed negative attitude towards it significantly more often than the British respondents.

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income. Question about basic income effect (*What could be the most likely effect of basic income in your work choices?*) was single choice.

Comparisons between countries on the support or lack thereof for basic income were compiled in Table 2. Regarding UBI support, the largest differences measured with single post-hoc test were observed between Spain and Great Britain, and Spain and Germany, on a much lower level between Poland and Great Britain and Spain. No statistically important differences were found among the supporters of the proposal only between Poland and Germany.

Table 2. Single *post-hoc* test[i] for between-country difference of proportions of respondents declaring voting for and against basic income

| Differences between	I would vote for it		I would vote against it	
	d-value	z-value	d-value	z-value
DE and ES	-0.080	-4.16**	0.056	4.51**
DE and GB	0.038	2.21**	0.043	3.52**
DE and PL	-0.018	-0.92	0.001	0.10
ES and GB	0.118	6.03**	-0.013	-1.21
ES and PL	0.062	2.82**	-0.055	-4.03**
GB and PL	-0.056	-2.84**	-0.042	-3.06**

Note: [i] Single *post-hoc* test with the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons;
      ** p-value<0.05.

Looking at UBI's opponents, the largest difference between countries was observed between Spain and, in order, Germany and Poland. On a slightly lower level were the differences between Great Britain vs Germany and Poland were observed. The last two comparisons, in which no significant differences were found, are very counter-intuitive; these are Poland-Germany and Spain-Great Britain tandems, so countries representing different welfare state regimes.

Hypothesis 2 has therefore only been validated in case of Spain, whereas the declarations of Polish respondents do not differ significantly from those of German and British respondents, which goes against our initial intuitions.

Table 3 contains the results of tests verifying the hypothesis regarding the statistical importance of the differences between the ratios of respondents declaring a certain level of knowledge about UBI, in each of the countries taken into account in this study. In the first part of Table 3, we presented information about between-country differences in numbers of respondents claiming full knowledge about UBI, while in the second part of the table, the between-country comparison of the proportion of respondents declaring absolute lack of knowledge about UBI is presented.

Figure 3. Basic income awareness[(i),(ii)]

Notes: [(i)] Single choice question: *How familiar are you with the concept known as "basic income"*?:
[1] – I understand it fully; [2] – I know something about it; [3] – I have heard just a little about it; [4] – I have never heard of it.
[(ii)] Pearson's chi-square for testing whether *basic income awareness* is *country* invariant: Chi-square=86.26; df=9; p-value<0.001.

Table 3. Single *post-hoc* test(i) for between-country differences of proportions of respondents declaring knowledge about basic income

Differences between	I understand it fully		I have never heard about it	
	d-value	z-value	d-value	z-value
DE and ES	-0.066	-3.86[**]	-0.024	-1.84
DE and GB	-0.033	-2.12[**]	-0.047	-3.53[**]
DE and PL	0.025	1.47	-0.077	-5.18[**]
ES and GB	0.033	1.76	-0.023	-1.46
ES and PL	0.091	4.73[**]	-0.053	-3.12[**]
GB and PL	0.058	3.25[**]	-0.030	-1.84

Note: [(i)] Single *post-hoc* test with the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons;
[**] p-value<0.05.

Looking at the results of single post-hoc test for between-country differences in proportions of respondents declaring full knowledge about UBI, a marked grouping of countries can be observed – i.e., on the one end there are ES and GB with the significantly higher ratio of respondents declaring full UBI awareness, and on the other PL and DE, with the lowest ratio of respondents declaring full

UBI awareness. Although for both pairs, ES-GB, and PL-DE, the differences are not statistically important, every cross-comparison between either abject of ES-GB pair with either of the PL-DE pair, shows a statistically significant difference. On the other hand, if we look at the ratio of respondents declaring a total lack of knowledge about UBI, then only the pair ES-GB doesn't show a statistically significant difference in proportions, while for every other pair such a difference in noted.

Figure 4 shows the between-country differences in the expected effects of UBI introduction.

Figure 4. Basic income effect[(i), (ii)]

Notes: [(i)] Single choice question: *What could be the most likely effect of basic income on your work choices? I would ...*: [1] – … stop working; [2] – … work less; [3] – … do more volunteering work; [4] – … spend more time with my family; [5] - … look for a different job; [6] … work as a freelancer; [7] … gain additional skills; [8] – A basic income would not affect my work choices.
[(ii)] Pearson's chi-square for testing whether *basic income effect* is *country* invariant: Chi-square=19.67; df=3; p-value<0.001.

By far the largest percentage of respondents declaring that the introduction of UBI would have no marked effect on their work choices was noted in ES and DE, and the smallest in GB and PL. It is worth noting that between ES and DE the difference in proportion of respondents choosing the answer: „A basic income would not affect my work choices" is statistically insignificant (see. Table 5 and results of single post-hoc test for between-country differences of basic income effect), but any other coupling of countries allows to formulate a hypothesis about statistical significance of the difference between achieved results. Taking into consideration the negative effect, we can observe that respondents in PL declared they would leave their jobs or work less as a result of UBI introduction most often out of all the groups. In this regard, the Polish respondents differ in a statistically significant way from respondents in GB, ES

and DE, even though these countries create a homogenous group characterized by statistically insignificant differentiation in observed proportions. Looking at the sum of respondents' answers to the two questions forming the last index of UBI implementation, i.e. the positive effect, we can see that, according to respondents' declarations, the introduction of UBI would bring most positive effects in ES and GB (that is, countries in which the citizens have the most knowledge about UBI), slightly smaller in DE and smallest in PL. Although the difference in proportions of respondents declaring a positive effect of UBI introduction in ES and GB are insignificant, any other pair of results differs in a statistically significant manner.

Table 4. Single *post-hoc* test(i) for between-country differences of basic income effect

Differences between	No possible effect		Negative effect		Positive effect	
	d-value	z-value	d-value	z-value	d-value	z-value
DE and ES	-0.030	-1.39	0.011	0.81	-0.057	-3.10**
DE and GB	0.044	2.15**	-0.013	-0.99	-0.019	-1.08
DE and PL	0.102	4.61**	-0.055	-3.60**	0.060	3.48**
ES and GB	0.074	3.30**	-0.024	-1.67	0.038	1.95
ES and PL	0.132	5.51**	-0.066	-4.00**	0.117	5.92**
GB and PL	0.058	2.55**	-0.042	-2.53**	0.079	4.27**

Note: (i) Single *post-hoc* test with the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons;
         ** p-value<0.05.

In order to establish the factors determining the inclination of the respondents to support the idea of UBI in each country, models of logistic regression have been constructed for each country separately. The dependent variable was based on the following question: *If there would be a referendum on introducing basic income today, how would you vote*?, assigning all the respondents to two separate categories in such a way that 1 was ascribed to respondents declaring a decided willingness to vote for UBI, i.e. „I would vote for it", and 0 to all the other answers. The group of predicators consisted of seven variables, including income awareness, gender, age, type of community, education level, full time job and having children. Table 6 contains information about the effect each of these independent variables had on the likelihood of supporting the idea of UBI. The data is presented separately for each of the four countries.

Table 5. Likelihood ratio test(i) for verifying the within-country impact of particular effect on likelihood to vote for basic income

Type of effect	Germany		Spain		Great Britain		Poland	
	χ^2	*p*-value	χ^2	*p*-value	χ^2	*p*-value	χ^2	*p*-value
Basic income awareness [*df*=2]	93.4	<0.001	9.2	0.010	78.8	<0.001	15.6	<0.001
Gender [*df*=1]	4.6	0.033	0.7	0.395	<0.01	0.883	0.6	0.439
Age [*df*=2]	0.7	0.723	2.7	0.266	6.8	0.034	1.4	0.493
Type of community [*df*=1]	1.3	0.264	2.3	0.128	0.1	0.804	0.4	0.526
Education level [*df*=2]	11.7	0.003	20.0	<0.001	2.1	0.351	11.8	0.003
Full time job [*df*=1]	26.8	<0.001	8.8	0.003	1.0	0.310	0.6	0.441
Having children [*df*=1]	<0.01	0.874	0.1	0.757	0.2	0.648	0.2	0.653
Model fit statistics								
Likelihood ratio test of a null model	χ^2=133.0; *df*=10 *p*-value<0.001		χ^2=44.8; *df*=10 *p*-value<0.001		χ^2=88.3; *df*=10 *p*-value<0.001		χ^2=31.8; *df*=10 *p*-value<0.001	
Pearson's chi-square goodness-of-fit test	χ^2=93.5; *df*=251 *p*-value=0.288		χ^2=242.0; *df*=192 *p*-value=0.008		χ^2=258.0; *df*=231 *p*-value=0.107		χ^2=206.4; *df*=156 *p*-value=0.004	
Nagelkerke *R*-square	0.218		0.113		0.203		0.094	

Note: (i) The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect (or all effects) from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect (or all effects in a null model) are equal to zero.

In each of the compared countries, the factor that had a significant influence on declared support for the idea of UBI, was the declared UBI awareness (the influence of this factor was decisive in DE, GB, and PL, and slightly lower in ES). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in all the countries two factors proved insignificant, i.e. type of community and having children, whereas the pattern of the influence of other social and demographic factors was characterized by substantial between-country variation. For example, gender determined the support of the idea of UBI only in DE, age only in GB, full-time employment in DE and ES, and education in all the countries apart from GB.

Table 6. Standardized estimates of b parameters and adjusted Exp(b) odds-ratio esti-
mates of logistic regression models explaining within-country likelihood to
vote for basic income

Type of effect	Poland	Spain	Great Britain	Poland
	Exp(β)	Exp(β)	Exp(β)	Exp(β)
Basic income awareness				
Fully understood	8.21**	1.97**	7.20**	1.80**
Something known	2.39**	1.06	1.55	0.99
Never heard or little known - reference category -	-	-	-	-
Gender				
Male (Female = 0)	1.44**	0.84	1.03	0.85
Age				
14–25	0.87	0.96	1.91**	1.01
26–39	1.09	1.40	1.45	1.31
40–65 – reference category –	-	-	-	-
Type of community				
City (rural area = 0)	1.24	1.42	1.08	0.87
Education level				
Primary or secondary	1.87**	2.94**	0.94	3.83**
High school	1.94**	1.56	0.74	1.76**
University degree – reference category –	-	-	-	-
Full time job				
Yes (No = 0)	0.40**	0.52**	0.81	1.19
Having children				
Yes (No = 0)	0.97	1.07	0.91	1.12

Note: ** p-value<0.05

The direction and strength of the effects is demonstrated in Table 6., which
contain standardized adjusted *Exp(*β*)* odds-ratio estimates of logistic regression
explaining within-country likelihood to vote for basic income. One can note,
that for each level of independent variable (i.e., type of effect) odds ratios value
rely on a comparison of the odds of voting for BI relatively to odds of voting
for BI in the so-called reference category of respondents. An odds ratio of 1.0
means that there is no effect at all, i.e., the odds of voting for BI in a specific
category of respondents are equal to odds of voting for in reference category.

The larger the deviation from 1.0 the larger the effect. An odds ratio above 1.0 indicates that the probability of voting for BI is more likely to occur in a specific category of respondents, while an odds ratio below 1.0 indicates that the event is more likely to occur in the reference category.

Looking at the above data, we can notice that in DE people declaring full awareness of UBI were 8 times more likely to support the idea than people who admitted they had heard either little or nothing about it. In GB, the quotient of chance of UBI support in the group declaring full awareness of it was over 7 times higher than in control group, whereas in ES and PL it was almost 2 times higher. As mentioned above, gender was a decisive factor only in DE, and the chances that a man would vote for UBI were 1.44 times higher than chances of support by women. Age constituted a differentiating factor in UBI support only in GB, where respondents under the age of 25 were almost 2 times more likely to support the idea than those in the 40-65 years-old group. Apart from GB, a deciding factor was also education, where people with university degrees had the lowest chance of supporting UBI. Indeed, in PL people with the lowest level of education supported UBI almost 4 times more often than those with university degrees, in ES almost three, and in DE almost two times more often. It is also worth mentioning that in ES and DE the chances to support UBI introduction by persons in full time employment constituted only 0.4 and 0.52 of those not in full time employment.

Table 7 contains information about the ratio of respondents supporting chosen arguments for the implementation of UBI. For each country, the results are shown for the whole studied group and the subgroup of respondents who supported UBI. It is worth mentioning that in each of the studied countries, the ratios of arguments chosen in both the entire group and the subgroup of UBI supporters are almost the same, with the subgroup of supporters presenting slightly higher ratios, which means that arguments for UBI are further strengthened by support for UBI. Looking at between-country differences, it should be pointed out that two arguments most commonly used in support of UBI were the same in all the countries: lowering of anxiety about financing basic needs, and creation of more equality and opportunity for the citizens. The third argument most often pointed to was, in DE and PL the conviction that UBI increases appreciation for household work and volunteering, in ES that it increases solidarity, because it is funded by everyone, and in GB that it encourages financial independence and self-responsibility.

Table 8 contains information about the ratio of respondents supporting chosen arguments against UBI. For each country the ratios have been shown both for the entire studied group and the subgroup of persons who are against UBI introduction. It is worth noting that in DE, GB and PL, the most commonly used argument is that it might encourage people to stop working, in ES the dominant

Table 7. Arguments for the basic income[i] – percent of cases in an entire sample[ii] and a subsample of respondents declaring voting for basic income

Arguments for the basic income	DE Sample N=1173 %	Rank	DE Subsample N=339 %	Rank	ES Sample N=804 %	Rank	ES Subsample N=360 %	Rank	GB Sample N=918 %	Rank	GB Subsample N=280 %	Rank	PL Sample N=659 %	Rank	PL Subsample N=248 %	Rank
It reduces anxiety about financing basic needs	67.0	1	73.1	1	48.8	1	47.6	2	53.6	1	61.5	1	51.0	1	54.9	1
It creates more equality of opportunity	41.4	2	51.7	2	42.7	2	57.3	1	39.0	2	48.6	2	43.9	2	51.9	2
It encourages financial independence and self-responsibility	28.1	5	35.0	4	30.8	4	35.1	4	33.4	3	40.5	3	18.3	5	20.2	6
It increases solidarity. because it is funded by everyone.	24.3	6	31.3	6	34.3	3	40.0	3	22.5	5	29.4	5	18.8	6	21.9	4
It reduces bureaucracy and administrative expenses	27.2	4	33.5	5	14.4	6	14.8	6	18.0	6	24.1	6	23.2	4	21.0	5
It increases appreciation for household work and volunteering	34.0	3	37.0	3	23.9	5	29.5	5	28.1	4	31.0	4	28.2	3	30.5	3

Notes: [i] Multiple choice question with randomized answer option: *Which of the following arguments for the basic oncome do you find convincing?* Choose all that apply: [1] - It reduces anxiety about financing basic needs; [2] It creates more equality of opportunity; [3] - It encourages financial independence and self-responsibility; [4] - It increases solidarity, because it is funded by everyone; [5] - It reduces bureaucracy and administrative expenses; [6] - It increases appreciation for household work and volunteering.
[ii] Respondents who chose the answer "None of the above" or did not choose any answer were excluded from the analysis.

Table 8. Arguments against the basic income[(i)] – percent of cases in an entire sample[(ii)] and a subsample of respondents declaring voting against basic income

Arguments against the **basic income**	DE				ES				GB				PL			
	Sample N=1248		Subsample N=174		Sample N=882		Subsample N=70		Sample N=1007		Subsample N=89		Sample N=740		Subsample N=102	
	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank
It is impossible to finance	41.3	3	59.6	3	37.4	4	65.8	1	30.9	5	47.1	3	45.0	3	57.6	3
It might encourage people to stop working	62.2	1	78.6	1	45.9	2	64.7	2	50.7	1	71.9	1	49.9	1	76.7	1
Foreigners might come to my country and take advantage of the benefit	42.6	2	37.6	5	39.1	3	47.6	4	45.3	2	44.8	4	45.3	2	64.7	2
It is against the principle of linking merit and reward	31.2	5	60.5	2	15.2	6	43.2	5	22.5	6	40.4	6	21.0	6	46.3	4
Only the people who need it most should get something from the state	34.1	4	52.5	3	47.1	1	48.1	3	38.5	3	40.6	5	34.7	4	44.9	5
It increases dependence on the state	29.8	6	42.2	4	25.9	5	42.5	6	32.1	4	53.4	2	21.6	5	31.8	6

Notes: (i) Multiple choice question with randomized answer option: *Which of the following arguments for the basic oncome do you find convincing?* Choose all that apply: [1] - It is impossible to finance; [2] - It might encourage people to stop working; [3] - Foreigners might come to my country and take advantage of the benefit; [4] - It is against the principle of linking merit and reward; [5] - Only the people who need it most should get something from the state; [6] It increases dependence on the state. Respondents who chose the answer "None of the above" were excluded from the analysis.
(ii) Respondents who chose the answer "None of the above" or did not choose any answer were excluded from the analysis.

argument is that only the people who need it most should get something from the state. In DE, GB and PL, the second argument was that UBI introduction would result in a higher inflow of immigrants, and in ES the second argument was that it would encourage the citizens to stop working. What links the data from Table 9 and Table 8 is that, similarly to the case of UBI supporters, in the case of its opponents, the arguments are further strengthened by the declaration of no support (in each of the countries the proportion of persons choosing a certain argument is significantly higher in the subgroup of opponents, compared to the whole studied group).

Discussion

Although discussions about UBI have become an element of heated exchange between supporters and opponents of this proposal, the quality of these discussions – mostly due to their speculative character – leaves much to be desired. An evident lack of deepened empirical analysis dictates the poor quality of discussion about positive and negative aspects of this proposed reform of existing conditional schemes. The Finnish experiment conducted by Kela, Finland's social insurance institution, which started in 2017 on a group of 2000 unemployed people and which is due to end in 2019, will not supply convincing data that could solve the uncertainties surrounding the program, because it does not fulfil the characteristics of a UBI (it is only applied to unemployed people and the 560 EUR it offers is below the minimum subsistence level).

Local experiments in places far away from Europe are very valuable but cannot be translated into answers to some of the questions being asked by researchers from the old continent. Because of that, analyses of basic income attitudes seem productive; even though they are based on respondents' declarations, they paint an image of social 'moods', which not only reflect the support or lack thereof for the proposal, but also supply more detailed information about hopes and fears related to it. With the use of opinion polls, we can conduct the first empirical tests of the 'speculative' consequences of UBI introduction. It is also important to remember that these polls do not happen in a social-economic-political vacuum, and that the condition of the economy (2008 crisis and its consequences for the Mediterranean region), political climate (radical parties ruling in central-eastern Europe), or social relations that are a result of these changes (Baranowski 2017), have a marked influence on the responses formulated in these questionnaires.

Although in this article we decided against a detailed attempt at explaining the obtained results in the context of particular events, it is important to remember that the political and economic situation influences the respondents' opinions on certain subjects, including basic income.

The next issue that should be articulated here is the methodology of public opinion polls. And so, for example, according to a study conducted by Ipsos in 2017, in which the main question was formulated differently than by Dalia Research (it was "The government should pay all residents in [country] a basic income in form of free and unconditional money in addition to any income received from elsewhere"), the highest support, 60%, was noted in Poland, in Germany it was about 52%, in Great Britain 33%, and in Spain only 31%. We can see a marked difference between the studies done by Ipsos and Dalia Research, particularly in case of Spain (31% vs 71%) and Great Britain (33% vs 63.1%). Similar results were obtained in Germany (52% vs 63.2%) and very similar in case of Poland (60% vs 62.3%). In both studies the sample sizes were similar, and data was weighted according to the most recent country Census data. In the latest round of the European Social Survey the question about UBI appeared for the first time and in PL the support was 58.5%, in Germany 45.8%, in the UK 50.8%, and in ES 49.5%.

In literature on UBI, one of the main advocates of the idea, Philippe van Parijs (2000), argued that the situation of women will undergo the most marked improvement after unconditional basic income is introduced (Alstott 2001). Data from Dalia Research shows that only in Germany the respondent's gender influenced their support for UBI, which might mean that women see the 'emancipatory' potential of the discussed program differently to its theoretical proponents.

Age – and it should be added that in the discussions about UBI, the issue of citizen's pensions are often also discussed (Pateman 2004, Van Parijs 2004, Willmore 2007) – played a statistically significant role only in the case of Great Britain, and was manifested by an almost two-fold higher support between young people (under 25 years-old) than between 40-year-olds and older people. One could assume that young people 'should' be supportive of the idea, particularly in Spain, which, after the recent crisis, has been struggling with high unemployment rate among young people (according to Eurostat's data from the end of June 2016, the average unemployment rate among young people was 45.2%), and the social security system leaves much to be desired.

Very interesting results were observed in regard to education (see Baranowski and Odrowąż-Coates 2018), which influences the support for UBI in all the countries, apart from Great Britain. The higher the education level, the lower the rate of support for the discussed program. And vice versa, the lower the education, the more common the support. On one hand, people with less education have worse paid jobs, are more often employed on precarious conditions, and are in more danger of unemployment, thus more likely to use the welfare state system. It shouldn't therefore come as a surprise that people who do not have large savings and above standard insurance in case of unforeseen

events, are more likely to support the idea of basic income. On the other hand, the negative attitude of educated people towards the basic income scheme can suggest their antiegalitarian attitudes, and a distancing from people with lower income and smaller assets.

Finally, we can approach the issue of the (potential) influence of UBI on the world of labour, that is – the relations between workers and employers, which is one of the focal points of discussions about unconditional cash benefits. Critics of UBI are particularly quick to point out – next to the high costs associated with the program (Cowan 2017) – the negative consequences of such a solution to labour supply. Dalia Research's study confirmed that in Poland, Germany and Great Britain, the idea that people may stop working is one of the major arguments against the introduction of UBI. In Poland, unlike in other analysed countries, respondents most often declared they would resign their jobs or work less hours after introduction of UBI. This is probably related to the quality of their jobs and remuneration (Poland as assembly room, low-paid jobs (Hardy 2009, Manjarin and Szlinder 2016, Mrozowicki and Maciejewska 2013)). The program would bring most positive consequences to Spanish and British people, who declared that, as a result of its introduction, they would spend more time with their families (so they would also limit their working hours) and/or gain new skills. Although the vast majority of respondents claimed that UBI would not have an impact on their work choices, from the perspective of the ongoing discussions, the declarations of positive and negative effects of the program are very important. The largest disparity was observed between Poland and Spain, which are both characterized by poor workers' rights protection and a relatively high unemployment rate (particularly in Spain). The declared consequences of UBI introduction have virtually no overlap, which should – considering the low level of social services and security in comparison to Germany and Great Britain – become an object of detailed analysis (also in the context of political disputes about welfare state reforms).

Conclusions

Bearing in mind the limitations associated with public opinion polls, which have a very long tradition (eg Goyder 1986, Katz 1966, LaPiere 1934, Larsen 2008, Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987), one can claim that in regard to the universal basic income proposal, which is discussed more and more often, studies like this constitute an important source of information about the citizens' attitudes towards crucial issues of social welfare. This article is a starting point for a broader reflection on the basic income phenomenon. With the use of statistical analysis, we tested three hypotheses, the potential consequences of

the proposed program on work-related behaviours, and analysed the differences in citizens' attitudes between countries. The first hypothesis was not confirmed, considering the two possible answers (*I would vote for it* and *I would probably vote for it*), which means that the attitudes towards UBI in Great Britain – the differences between GB vs PL and DE were not significant – which represents the residual welfare regime, do not differ significantly from the ones present in Poland and Germany.

The second hypothesis, which claimed that support for UBI would be the highest in Poland and Spain, i.e. countries with a relatively low level of social services, also wasn't confirmed by the data. Although in Spain the support for UBI was the highest among the chosen countries, the results from Poland, which are in line with German and British results, show that the generosity of existing welfare state institutions, or the lack of it, do not constitute a coherently decisive factor in the support for UBI.

However, testing of hypothesis 3 brought concrete results, as respondents declaring full awareness of the idea of UBI are characterized by a much higher chance of supporting it. In each of the four chosen countries the results were statistically significant, and showed that in Germany persons with full awareness of the UBI program would support it in the referendum over eight times more often than those without it. In Great Britain it was over seven, and in Spain and Poland almost two (1.97 and 1.80 respectively) times more often. This means – although it is necessary to remember that the study did not ask about the economic status or political views – that basic income awareness has significant influence on support for the program. In the nearest future, this can translate to the attitudes the Europeans have towards the discussed idea. It can also serve as a guideline for the proponents of unconditional social services, suggesting the path to achieving greater social support for UBI.

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