@ARTICLE{Tarnowski_Maciej_Knowledge_2022, author={Tarnowski, Maciej}, number={No 4}, journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria}, pages={279-297}, howpublished={online}, year={2022}, publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN}, publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego}, abstract={In a few short paragraphs of The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell presents his theory of introspective knowledge based on the concept of knowledge by acquaintance. In this article, I critically analyze these comments by Russell and their proposed application by contemporary authors, including Brie Gertler (2001; 2011) and Laurence BonJour (2003). I show how these theories differ from the competing ‘inner‑sense theories’ and try to show that they are inconsistent with Gareth Evans’s ‘transparency’ observation. Then I compare acquaintance theories with Alex Byrne’s (2005; 2012) ‘transparency’ theory and show that Byrne’s theory offers a simpler account of mechanisms governing introspection and attribution of mental states to other agents than the observer.}, type={Artykuł}, title={Knowledge by acquaintance and the transparency of introspection}, URL={http://sd.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/129814/2022-04-PFIL-18.pdf}, doi={10.24425/pfns.2022.143864}, keywords={introspection, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, B. Russell, self‑knowledge, transparency}, }